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I. INTRODUCTION

On December 1, 2000, a revised Federal Evidence Rule 703 will take
effect, unless changed in the interim. Rule 703 will impose a duty upon
trial judges to restrict wholesale introduction into evidence of expert
background data, the stuff upon which an expert witness relies. The revised
rule supplies critically needed improvements in the area of expert
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testimony law. Accordingly, it is imperative that the careful work of the
Federal Evidence Rules Advisory Committee not be undone.
When the evidence rules were originally drafted, the architects of the
Federal Rules of Evidence expanded the range of individuals allowed to
propound opinions. This was the thrust of Rule 702.' In that rule, a liberal
definition of "expert" was embraced. The next rule in the set, Rule 703,
provided some balance. While it clarified the right of an expert to utilize
hearsay information in order to formulate opinions, it imposed quality
standards on that information. Only data reasonably relied upon by experts
in the field at large would be considered adequate to support the opinions
of a trial witness.2 An expert witness could not base conclusions on arcane
or outdated material.
Reliance upon solid, reliable information was necessary. Once this
foundation requirement was satisfied, an expert witness was allowed to
give her opinion in court. However, a question still remained. What
became of the expert's background data? Could it be formally moved into
evidence? In a medical case, what if the background data consisted of
letters from multiple physicians to the trial doctor, analyzing a plaintiffs
claim. Perhaps none of the "outside" doctors appeared in court. Did their
letters nonetheless qualify as exhibits and come into evidence?
Allowing transformation of such written hearsay into trial proof
introduces the strong possibility of abuse. By these means, all manners of
raw and unexpurgated hearsay could be dumped into the record. To
counteract the tendencies of some courts to allow this practice, the Federal
Rules Advisory Committee took decisive action in 1998. It formulated an
amendment of Rule 703 which would bar the wholesale introduction into
evidence of an expert's background data.3
The pendency of this rule modification raises understandable
questions. Was alteration of the original rule needed? Had the prior rule
been abused? Did Rule 703, as originally drafted and promulgated, create
a hidden device for opportunistic practitioners to circumvent the laws
against hearsay? Did it spawn confusion in the minds of many judges and
lawyers? For reasons developed in this Article, the answer to each of these
important questions is "yes."
How did the disarray created by the original rule, sought to be set
right by the Evidence Rules Advisory Committee, develop? Part II of this
Article traces the evolution of Rule 703. It identifies the confusion
spawned by the current provision. In Part III, misapplication of appropriate
doctrines is identified in specific cases. Numerous trial court decisions
illustrate the need for guidance in the field of expert witness law, as do the
1. See FED. R. EVID. 702.
2. See id. at 703.
3. See id. advisory committee's note.
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appellate opinions in Part IV. Commentators have called for reforms and
their views are reflected in Part V. The Article concludes with the
proposition that when trial judges properly perform their gatekeeping
function, they will order the details of an expert's underlying data to
remain undisclosed. This is also the conclusion of the federal rule drafters.
If. THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN EXPERT WITNESS LAW

The Federal Rules of Evidence became effective twenty-five years
As a part of Article VII, the framers wisely included a rule which
governed the type of information upon which an expert could ground his
or her conclusions.5 Formulating courtroom opinions was important
business, in the view of the drafting committee.6 Accordingly, they decided
that a witness would not be able to speculate simply on the strength of
flimsy or incomplete information.7 Rather, the witness who gave expert
opinions was required to utilize only data which other experts would
reasonably take into account when producing scientific conclusions.'
The rule drafters embraced a prudent philosophy. An expert's opinion
had to be well-supported and scientifically sound. Rule 703 occupied a
central position among the expert witness rules, and it became a linchpin
in the development of modem opinion testimony law. The rule imposed a
duty upon proponents of scientific or technical evidence to show the court,
over objection, that their expert utilized scientifically reliable, credible data
in developing opinions. Rule 703, Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts,
as originally promulgated and as presently constituted, provides:
ago.4

The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert
bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or
made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or
data need not be admissible in evidence.9
Utilizing this provision, lawyers realized that material any expert used
to reach conclusions could be studied by the expert prior to trial. When it
came time to testify in court, the underlying data did not have to be lodged
in the trial record. Information consulted by the witness could be reviewed
in advance and was not required to be independently admissible. The

4. See id.

5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See 1d.

8. See id.
9. FED. R. EvID. 703.
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expert's out-of-court study of a medical situation or a scientific process at
issue in the case was sufficient.
Suppose the medical condition of a person or the validity of a process
were key questions in litigation. The trial expert could scrutinize the
involved person or process directly and combine the learning gained from
such hands-on study with reports of other experts who had accomplished
a similar review. Although the latter experts might not be called for
testimony, conclusions emanating from this mix of methodologies would
be admissible through the trial expert. She could disclose the details of her
own examination, reflect that she had also relied upon reports of others,
and announce her conclusions. That reports of others could form part of the
mix is evident from the original Advisory Committee's 1975 Note,
affirming that a source of expert opinion might be the "presentation of data
to the expert outside of court and other than by his own perception."
After a settling-in period, courts adjusted to the new approach.
Experts utilized reliable hearsay sources when formulating courtroom
opinions. By 1999, mostjudges applied this part of Rule 703 appropriately.
There were only occasional episodes to the contrary which had to be set
aright by appellate tribunals." For the most part, production in court of the
testifying expert's conclusions went smoothly. Rule 703 had the salutary
effect envisioned by its framers of bringing "judicial practice into line with
the practice of the experts themselves when not in court."' 2
Meanwhile, the second feature of the rule was going awry.'
Confusion abounded when judges were asked to determine whether the
raw data upon which an expert relied was itself admissible. Clearly, the
testifying expert's conclusions were competent. But could the hearsay,
particularly written hearsay in the form of a nontestifying doctor's report,
be transmitted to the jury?
The problem became acute when a testifying expert based a major
portion of his or her findings upon reports of others. Uncertainty clouded
the question of whether out-of-court reports of nontestifying experts were
fully admissible simply because the in-court expert relied upon them.

10. Id. advisory committee's note.
11. Trial courts may allow expert opinion based upon nonrecord material, as long as the
expert's reliance upon the material is reasonable. The decision in Peabody Coal Co. v. Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs., 165 F.3d 1126 (7th Cir. 1999), makes this clear. The opinion
states: "Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is explicit that the materials on which an expert
witness bases an opinion need not be admissible, let alone admitted, in evidence, provided that they
are the sort of thing on which a responsible expert draws in formulating a professional opinion."
Id. at 1128. The court adds the comment that the opposing party should have the chance to review
the expert's underlying materials, preferably prior to trial. See id. at 1129.
12. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note.
13. See FED. R. EVID. 703.
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Could the proponent of the courtroom expert cause the trial witness to
quote conclusions contained in out-of-court documents and sources?
I. CONFUSION AND ABUSES

After Rule 703 became effective in 1975, lawyers who called experts
to the stand expanded the scope of their testimony. Instead of simply
having their courtroom expert assert his or her opinions based upon the
expert's own personal examination of a person or process, the presentation
was often broadened. The trial witness frequently invoked the names of
others, perhaps prominent in the field, who had participated in the
evaluation process. The witness' testimony also might have referenced the
fact that these other experts supplied reports.
In a medical case, for example, a doctor called on behalf of the
plaintiff would perhaps testify that two other physicians had diagnosed the
patient, even though they were not to be called as trial witnesses. Initially,
the plaintiff's attorney might carefully avoid asking the trial witness to read
from the reports of the nontestifying doctors. However, after eliciting
details of the witness' own treatment of the patient, as well as the fact that
the testifying doctor looked at third party reports, a critical juncture was
often reached. It was here that an enterprising plaintiff's attorney might
offer the hearsay reports of the outside, nontestifying experts as evidence.
The proffer would sound something like this: "Your honor, since the
doctor on the stand has referenced the fact that Doctors A and B also
worked on this case, we submit their reports as exhibits." This would
almost certainly occur when conclusions ratifying the opinion of the
plaintiff's trial doctor were included in the hearsay documents. When this
step was taken, many lawyers and judges became confused. Could a
successful objection be made to the proffer, the opposing lawyer might
wonder? From the judge's perspective, should such an objection be
sustained?
Cases abound which illustrate the presence of judicial uncertainty in
this situation. In United States v. Tran Trong Cuong,'4 a doctor was
indicted in federal court for dispensing prescription drugs for other than
legitimate medical purposes.' 5 He was convicted on 127 counts.' 6 During
the trial, the government called a medical expert who had reviewed charts
of patients treated by the defendant doctor.' 7 The witness gave his opinion
that narcotics prescribed by the defendant would do limited medical good

14. 18 F.3d 1132 (4th Cir. 1994).
15. See id. at 1133.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 1135.
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and such drugs would lead to addiction."8 In his view, the medications did
not supply appropriate care by a family physician.19
The witness also testified as to the qualifications of another physician,
Dr. Stevenson. 2 Dr. Stevenson had reviewed records on a number of the
patients, and prepared a report.2' He did not testify in person. 22 However,
the government's trial doctor told the jury that Dr. Stevenson's findings
were in agreement with his own.23 This was done over the objection of the
defendant.24 The Court of Appeals referred to the doctor who testified:
"When asked if his conclusions were contrary to those of Dr. Stevenson,
the witness responded, 'No. My findings were essentially the same."'"
The appellate court reversed. 26 The court held that the trial judge had
misapplied appropriate doctrines respecting admission of the trial expert's
underlying information. 27 While the trial witness could testify that he
reviewed Dr. Stevenson's report and that he relied upon it in reaching his
opinion, he could not quote its conclusion.28 It was error to allow this
without calling Dr. Stevenson to the stand.29 To do otherwise subjects the
defendant to the testimony of a witness whom he cannot cross-examine. 30
Further, "Dr. MacIntosh [the government's trial witness] bolstered his
testimony by claiming that an outstanding doctor, who is also a lawyer and
president of the Medical Society [Dr. Stevenson], agrees with him.'
Rule 703 does not permit such circumventions. The court observed
that even though an expert witness may base his opinion on underlying
information, "it does not follow that the otherwise inadmissible
information may come into evidence just because it has been used by the
expert in reaching his opinion. 32 The Court of Appeals set forth a vigorous
conclusion:
MacIntosh's testimony as to Stevenson's findings and his
credentials was given in an effort to convince the jury of the
accuracy and reliability of MacIntosh's opinions, and also to
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1143.
See id. at 1135.
See id.
Id. at 1143.
See id. at 144.
See id. at 1143-44.
See id. at 1143.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 1144.
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put before the jury Stevenson's opinion as to the defendant's
actions without subjecting Stevenson to cross-examination.
This is unfair to the defendant as it denies his fundamental
right to cross-examination and is an improper use of expert
testimony.33
In another federal court, the trial judge permitted back door hearsay.
A medical malpractice action involved a claim that the doctor failed to
inform the plaintiff that she had cancer. 35 A defense expert who appeared
for the doctor bolstered his courtroom opinion by referring to letters
received from other prominent doctors.36 The expert was asked if his
testimony was consistent with the opinions of the doctors who had
supplied letters, and the expert replied "yes, very much so. ' ' 7 Ajudgment
in favor of the defendant doctor was reversed on appeal. 38 The letters from
nontestifying doctors enhanced the credibility of the defendant's trial
expert, and they were pure hearsay. 39 Adding to the prejudice was the
strategy of defense counsel in closing argument.40 Counsel for the
defendant reminded the jury several times that the opinion of the defense
expert was consistent with the other physicians who provided letters. 4 ' The
appellate court observed: "[D]efense counsel's tactic simultaneously
conveyed hearsay testimony to the jury and improperly bolstered [the
courtroom expert's] credibility." 42
Likewise, state courts have not been immune from the need to correct
trial errors committed in the admission of an expert's underlying data. In
43 the defendants were sued for medical malpractice."
Kim v. Nazarian,
A
radiologist was accused of negligence in reading Linda Sung Hee Kim's
X-rays. 45 The X-rays disclosed an abnormal region in her hip, plaintiff

33. Id.
34. See Hutchinson v. Groskin, 927 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1991).
35. See id. at 723.
36. See id. at 724.
37. Id. at 725.
38. See id. at 726.
39. See id. at 725.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. Id. Compounding the problems in this case, it was unclear how much the trial witness
actually relied on the letters in the formulation of his own opinion. See id. at 726. Rather, the
proponent of the expert appeared to use the documents in an attempt to prove that other experts

agreed with the defense doctor's prognosis. See id.
43. 576 N.E.2d 427 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
44. See id. at 429 (defendants were Gordon R. Nazarian, M.D., and Lake County Radiology
Associates, S.C.).
45. See id. (plaintiffs were Bong Jin Kim and Young Sil Kim, parents of Linda Sung Hee
Kim).
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contended, which went undetected by the defendant doctor.' The defense
attorney made an opening statement wherein he referred to a defense
expert who would explain that the X-rays appeared normal.47 The
testimony would be that there was no negligence involved in reading them.
Defendants' attorney added that this defense witness' testimony should be
accepted because he reviewed his opinion with several other radiologists.
As it turned out, these "other radiologists" did not appear at trial to provide
testimony.4 9
When the case for the defense was presented, the expert, who was
referred to in the opening statement, testified and asserted that Linda's
condition looked completely normal on the X-rays.5" He was then asked by
the direct examiner: "In finalizing your opinion, did you consult with
various other radiologists in your department?" 5 ' When the witness
answered yes, the following occurred:
Q.
A.

And did any of the doctors you consulted indicate there
was any abnormality on these films?52
None of them saw any abnormality.

Through this methodology, the opinions of nontestifying doctors were
placed before the jury. The authors of the out-of-court opinions, opinions
which were damaging to the plaintiffs, were able to "speak" through the
conduit of the trial witness.
In addition to the foregoing testimony, an additional defense expert
was asked whether he consulted others. 53 He said he passed Linda's
radiologies on to one of his partners, another radiologist. 54 The defense
attorney continued:
Q.
A.

And what were you told by that radiologist as to what
his interpretation was?
He thought it was normal.55

The force of such evidence was to undercut plaintiffs' position that
46. See id.
47. See id. at 430.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 432.
51. Id.
52. Id. Even though some facts can be adduced for the limited purpose of explaining the basis
for the expert's opinion, this does not include simply parroting the corroborative opinions solicited
from nontestifying colleagues.
53. See id. at 431.
54. See id. at 432.
55. Id. at 431.
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Linda's X-rays revealed an abnormality. Procedurally, the plaintiffs had
filed a motion in limine prior to trial to have the trial court prevent
defendant's experts from testifying to the opinions of other nontestifying
doctors with whom they consulted regarding Linda's X-rays. 6 The trial
court denied this motion in limine.5 7 Further, upon trial of the case, the
court overruled an objection when the direct examiner took up the topic of
consultation by a defense expert with others. 8 After the objection by the
plaintiffs was rejected, witness examination continued. 9 In response to a
question by the direct examiner, the expert told the court and jury: "The
other radiologists [with whom I consulted] felt that the films were
normal." 6
After the jury returned a defense verdict, the plaintiff appealed. 61 The
appellate court wisely reversed. 2 Several important points were made.63
"Rule 703 does not create an exception to the rule against hearsay," said
the court. 64 After all, the provision is part of Article VII of the evidence
rules which relates to opinion testimony, not article VIII governing
hearsay. 65 Also, Rule 703 does not allow "an expert's testimony to simply
parrot the corroborative opinions solicited from nontestifying
colleagues . . . . The party who is unable to cross-examine the
corroborative opinion of the expert's colleague . . . will likely be

prejudiced." 66 The court added: "Moreover, defendants' attorney
highlighted the corroborative testimony in his opening statement, and he
also emphasized in his closing argument that more experts agreed with
defendants' position than with the plaintiffs." 67 The improperly admitted
testimony was prejudicial and reversible error.6 8 Accordingly, the plaintiffs
were entitled to a new trial.69
Preventing trial judges from misapplying Rule 703 is a subject which
has come up in other decisions. To be sure, it has reached appellate
tribunals in contexts similar to Nazarian, cases wherein the trial expert
56. See id. at 430.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 431.
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. See id. at433.
62. See id. at435.
63. See id. at 433.
64. Id.
65. See FED. R. EVID. 703.
66. Kim, 576 N.E.2d at 434.
67. Id. at 435. Again, as in the Hutchinson case, a reliance question clouded the issue, in
addition to the problem of admission of hearsay. 927 F.2d at 725; see also Wingo v. Rockford
Mem'l Hosp., 686 N.E.2d 722, 730 (111. App. Ct. 1997).
68. See Kim, 576 N.E.2d at 434.
69. See id.
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invoked the bolstering opinions of hearsay declarants. In a variation on this
pattern, sometimes the expert on the stand reads to the jury some of the
findings and conclusions from reports of "outside" doctors. Finally, the
hearsay sometimes takes documentary form when the trial witness is
shamelessly used as a conduit for written reports of nontestifying experts,
and they are introduced as exhibits. The vice in all of these formats is the
same: exposure of the trier of fact to hearsay reports which are untested by
cross-examination.
For example, in California, the issue in People v. Campos70 was
whether Jose Campos was mentally ill.7 He contended that he was not,
and he wanted out of state prison.72 The state claimed he was a mentally
disordered offender. 73 A jury trial addressed the issue.74 A psychiatrist with
the Department of Mental Health was the only witness called by the state
to testify concerning the mental condition of Campos. 75 The psychiatrist
based her opinion on her personal treatment of the prisoner as well as
reports prepared by Department of Corrections and Department of Mental
Health professionals who evaluated Campos.76 The psychiatrist testified
that these reports, prepared by nontestifying professionals, were consistent
with her diagnosis of Campos. 77 They agreed with her opinion that he was
a mentally disordered offender, she said.7 8
The trial court erred when it allowed the psychiatrist to testify that the
written evaluations of others confirmed the trial expert's opinion that
Campos was mentally ill.79 The conclusion of these nontestifying experts
was inadmissible hearsay. 8 However, an expert witness may not, on direct
examination, reveal the content of reports prepared or opinions expressed
by nontestifying experts.81
In addition to oral testimony, outside written reports were received in
evidence against Campos.82 The trial court erred by admitting these
documents authored by nontestifying experts.83 The rule which allows an
expert to state the reasons upon which an opinion is based may not be used

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 113 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
Seeid. at 113.
See id.
See id. at 114.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 115.
Seeid. at 114.
See id. at 115.
See id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol52/iss4/1

10

Carlson: Is Revised Expert Witness Rule 703 a Critical Modernizaton for th
EXPERT WITNESS RULE 703

as a vehicle to bring before the jury incompetent exhibits.8 4 Were the law
otherwise, doctors who testify as to the basis for their opinion could turn
a generally appropriate rule into a channel through which testifying doctors
could5 place the reports of innumerable out-of-court doctors before the
8
jury.
A Florida trial court's decision to admit an uncorroborated laboratory
report simply because a defense expert relied upon it resulted in reversal.86
Nobody involved in the testing, which the report reflected, appeared as a
witness in a medical malpractice case.87 However, the proponent of the
report argued on appeal that the report was properly received in evidence
because it was one of the bases for their expert's opinion. 88 The District
Court of Appeals explained why it reversed a verdict for the defendant:
"[A]n expert's testimony may not be used merely to serve as a conduit to
place otherwise inadmissible evidence before a jury."89
In criminal cases, misapplication of the rule can result in destruction
of constitutional rights. In State v. Towne," a prosecution expert in
psychiatry testified in a Vermont trial that he had consulted with a top New
Mexico psychiatrist.9 ' The issue was whether the defendant was criminally
responsible or insane.' When asked whether the nontestifying New
Mexico expert agreed with the prosecution doctor's opinion that the
defendant was mentally competent, the state's witness replied: "I would
say that [the New Mexico psychiatrist] is in concurrence with my opinion
in this case."
On appeal from the conviction, the Vermont Supreme Court was not
misled by the prosecution's justification that the outside evidence simply
illustrated the basis for the opinion of the trial expert.94 Rather, the court
suggested that using one expert to slide the opinion of another into
evidence violated sound evidence law principles which barred hearsay. 95
Moreover, the Vermont witness' recitation of the New Mexico doctor's
opinion violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront
adverse witnesses. 96 Like the outside doctor who could not be cross-

84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See Kurynka v. Tamarac Hosp. Corp., 542 So. 2d 412,413 (Fla, 4th DCA 1989).
87. See id.

88. See id.
89. Id.

90. 453 A.2d 1133 (Vt. 1982).
91.
92.
93.
94.

See id. at 1134.
See id.
Id.
Seeid. at 1135.

95. See id.
96. Seeid. at 1136.
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examined in Tran Trong Cuong,97 opinions of the New Mexico doctor
were introduced in a way that protected him from cross-examination.98
This denial of confrontation resulted in an abridgment of defendant's
constitutional rights. 99 Since no cross-examination could be had of the

New Mexico doctor, admission of his opinion was fatal to the
conviction.' °°
A common thread runs through all of these cases. In each, there was
0
an erroneous decision by a trial judge to admit "consultation" testimony.' '
This is testimony from a trial witness who either relies upon or consults an
outside expert, after which the proponent of the trial witness tries to
introduce the facts, findings, or conclusions of that outside expert." 2 In
each case the court permitted the trial witness to recite the findings of
another expert, even though this latter person did not testify. 3 Sometimes
the court received documents from a third party expert as well.104 In each
case, the practices identified here created reversible error. 5
Frequently, courts of appeal have reached the right result and have
overturned judgments below, but only after considerable struggle." °
Lacking guidance from the text of original Rule 703, appellate tribunals
had to "go it alone" in divining the correct disposition of an expert's
background data.0 7 Notwithstanding the lack of express advice in Rule
703 or its underlying Advisory Committee Note, courts have forthrightly
reversed where erroneous decisions in lower courts required it.'0 8
Reversal has occurred in both civil and criminal cases.'0 9 These
appellate rulings affirm the proposition that, standing alone, the fact that
the trial witness consulted with an outside expert is insufficient to support
introduction of that outside expert's hearsay."0 The benefits of positive
guidelines for the trial bench in these difficult situations seems apparent.
Rule 703 as originally promulgated did not embrace any distinct advisory

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
Groskin,
App. Ct.
102.
103.

See supra notes 14-30 and accompanying text.
See Towne, 453 A.2d at 1136.
See id.
See id.
See United States v. Tran Trong Cuong, 18 F.3d 1132 (4th Cir. 1994); Hutchinson v.
927 F.2d 722, 725 (2d Cir. 1991); Kim v. Nazarian, 576 N.E.2d 427, 428-29, 435 (Ill.
1991); Towne, 453 A.2d at 1135.
See cases cited supra note 101.
See cases cited supra note 101.

104. See Campos, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 115; Kurynka, 542 So. 2d at 413.

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

See Campos, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 115; Kurynka, 542 So. 2d at 413.
See cases cited supra notes 101, 104.
See cases cited supra notes 86, 101.
See cases cited supra notes 86, 101.
See, e.g., supra notes 14 & 34 and accompanying text.
See cases cited supra notes 101, 104.
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respecting this problem."' The new rule does so. Evidence that this is
needed comes from cases wherein trial judges erred in admitting
underlying hearsay." 2 The decisions cited in this Part underline the
advisability of clear direction for the bench and bar in the complex field of
admissibility of expert witness foundations." 3 Trial judges have sometimes
been misled." 4 Appellate correction has been required." 5 Absent
regulatory guideposts, repetition of the problem seems certain.
IV. APPELLATE DIRECTIONS
Misapplication of the rules has not been the exclusive province of
selected trial court decisions. A handful of appellate opinions have also
taken wrong turns. 1 6 In Lewis v. Rego Co.," 7 a products liability action
was brought against a manufacturer of a valve, seeking recovery in
connection with the explosion of a propane cylinder." 8 The plaintiff called
an expert in physical metallurgy to give his opinion that the defective valve
was the cause of the incident." 9 The expert had discussed the case with
another metallurgist, and wanted to relate the other expert's conclusion. 2 '
That conclusion apparently agreed with the opinion of the trial witness as
to causation."' Objection to the out-of-court discussion between these two
experts was sustained. 2 2 The court of appeals said this exclusion of
evidence should not have happened:
"Inquiry concerning the conversation
23
should have been permitted."'
Lewis has been cited by commentators as reflective of cases which
demonstrate the willingness of some courts to admit inadmissible
hearsay.' 24 While later cases suggest this approach is unsound, there was
a special circumstance at play in the Lewis litigation.'25 In fairness, it is to
be noted that the trial court had allowed an expert to relate the findings of

111. See cases cited supra notes 86, 101.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

See cases cited supra notes 101, 104.
See cases cited supra notes 101, 104.
See cases cited supra notes 101,104.
See cases cited supra notes 101, 104.
See infra notes 117 & 130 and accompanying text.
757 F.2d 66 (3d Cir. 1985).
See id. at 66.
119. See id. at71.
120. See id. at 72.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 73-74.
123. Id. at 74.
124. See Pamela Bucy, The Poor Fitof TraditionalEvidentiaryDoctrine and Sophisticated
Crime:An EmpiricalAnalysis ofHealth CareFraudProsecutions,63 FORDHAM L. REV. 383,409
(1994).
125. 757 F.2dat74.
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a nontestifying expert at the behest of one party, then barred the other side
from bringing out further and different conclusions authored by the same
nontestifying expert. 126 The trial court allowed the defense to elicit
information about this outside witness' views but did not allow the
plaintiff to do S0.27 This was error. 28 The scales were not balanced, and
the plaintiff was unfairly prejudiced. 29 This factor perhaps prompted some
of the decisional language broadly approving recitation by trial witnesses
of conclusions from outside experts.
Another decision from the same circuit permitted the witness on the
stand to recite information gathered from "outside" sources. In Stevens v.
CessnaAircraft Co.,"3 ° the trial judge allowed a physician to quote from
interviews he had with third parties, after the physician stated his
opinion. 3 ' An airplane crash killed the pilot. 32 Cessna Aircraft was sued
over a claimed design defect.' 33 The manufacturer countered with the
accusation that the crash resulted from pilot error, not a defective
aircraft. 34 The'defense physician had interviewed friends and associates
of the pilot.' He concluded the pilot was under a great deal of stress in his
personal life, and this stress caused errors while in flight that precipitated
the crash. 36 To substantiate his position, the doctor repeated for the jury
key portions of his interviews with the pilot's acquaintances. 37 He also
played tapes of the conversations. 31 The jury returned a verdict for
Cessna. 39 The appeals court affirmed in an unpublished opinion 4 ° In
doing so, it would appear that the court allowed untested hearsay to tip the
balance in favor of one party.
To the extent that the immediately foregoing cases reflect a "let it all
in" philosophy, they are out of step with modem trends. 4 ' Fortunately, a
large and growing number of federal court of appeals decisions take a

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
634 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 806 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1986).
See id. at 140.
See id. at 138.
See id. at 139.
See id.
See id. at 140.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 140-41.
See Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Stevens, 806 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1986).
See infra notes 143-58 and accompanying text.
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contrary view. 42 Opinions from the Second, 43 Fourth, 144 Seventh,
146
47
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits make the point. Many state court
decisions
4 Texas, 149
Florida,
from
drawn
cases
Prominent
accord.
are in
5 2 North Dakota, 53
California,5 0 Massachusetts,' 5 1 New Jersey,
Wisconsin,154 Virginia,'55 and other states 5 6 follow a careful, exclusionary

142. See infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Groskin, 927 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1991). Not all of the cases from
each of the individual circuits listed here will take the exclusionary approach reflected in the
highlighted cases. In some circuits, the line of authority has not been completely consistent. The
author has included decisions from selected circuits which seem to clearly reject wholesale
admission of underlying data as affirmative evidence.
144. See, e.g., United States v. Tran Trong Cuong, 18 F.3d 1132 (4th Cir. 1994).
145. See, e.g., In re James Wilson Assocs., 965 F.2d 160, 172-73 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining
that an expert is normally allowed to explain the facts underlying his opinion, but not if the expert
is "being used as a vehicle for circumventing the rules of evidence"); Gong v. Hirsch, 913 F.2d
1269, 1272-73 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
prohibiting plaintiffs medical expert from relying on a statement made by a doctor who was not
the treating physician at the time of decedent's illness and who had no personal knowledge of the
decedent's illness); United States v. Tomasian, 784 F.2d 782,786 (7th Cir. 1986) ("Rule 703 does
not sanction the simple transmission of hearsay; it only permits an expert opinion based on
hearsay.").
146. See, e.g., Pelster v. Ray, 987 F.2d 514, 526-27 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that an expert
may not rely on hearsay statements to prove the truth of the statements themselves); Boone v.
Moore, 980 F.2d 539 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that an expert may not use inadmissible evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted, but may use such evidence to indicate what information and
material he relied on in forming an expert opinion); United States v. Grey Bear, 883 F.2d 1382,
1392-93 (8th Cir. 1989) ("We are persuaded that FED. R. EVID. 703 does not permit an expert to
circumvent the rules of hearsay by testifying that other experts, not present in the courtroom,
corroborate his views.").
147. See, e.g., United States v. 0.59 Acres of Land, 109 F.3d 1493, 1496 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding that when an expert uses inadmissible evidence in forming an opinion, that evidence may
not be admitted to explain the expert's opinion without a limiting instruction).
148. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 549 So. 2d 1071, 1072 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (noting that an
expert may not be used as a conduit for otherwise inadmissible hearsay).
149. See, e.g., First Sw. Lloyds Ins. Co. v. MacDowell, 769 S.W.2d 954, 958 (Tex. 6th App.
1989) (suggesting that while an expert may make general and cursory reference to hearsay basis,
to permit him to discuss such basis in detail on direct is improper).
150. See, e.g., People v. Nicolaus, 817 P.2d 893,910 (Cal. 1991) (stating that an expert "may
not under guise of reasons bring before the jury incompetent hearsay evidence") (quoting People
v. Coleman, 695 P.2d 189, 203 (Cal. 1985)). See also supra note 70 and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g., Grant v. Lewis/Boyle, Inc., 557 N.E.2d 1136, 1139 (Mass. 1990) (holding that
a physician's expert witness reports were inadmissible because they relied on the reports of other
physicians).
152. See, e.g., Hartman v. Yawger, 514 A.2d 545,549 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986) (stating
that an end run around the hearsay rule is not warranted).
153. See, e.g., Slaaten v. Amerada Hess Corp., 549 N.W.2d 765,768 (N.D. 1990) (stating that
the fact that an exhibit is a document upon which expert relied upon does not make the document
admissible).
154. See, e.g., State v. Weber, 496 N.W.2d 762,766-67 (Wis. 2d Ct. App. 1993) (explaining
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approach when faced with the potential introduction of inadmissible
background material used by an expert. Rule enactments have changed
state rules as well. Minnesota15 7 and Louisiana 15 8 have revised their state
formulations of local expert testimony rules to address the problems
disclosed in this Article.
A 1997 decision reflects the view of several federal courts that are
that hearsay data upon which an expert formulates an opinion is not admissible as evidence unless
it falls under a recognized hearsay exception).
155. See, e.g., Todd v. Williams, 409 S.E.2d 450, 451-52 (Va. 1991) (holding that a
physician's use of two absent physicians' opinions to bolster his own opinion was inadmissible
hearsay); McMunn v. Tatum, 379 S.E.2d 908, 912 (Va. 1989) (excluding hearsay opinions that
expert relied on).
156. See generallySims v. Safeway Trails, Inc., 764 S.W.2d 427,429 (Ark. 1989); Thorne v.
U-Haul of Metro D.C., Inc., 580 A.2d 672,675 (D.C. 1990); Myers v. American Seating Co., 637
So. 2d 771, 774 (La. 1st Ct. App. 1994); Bruflat v. Mister Guy, Inc., 933 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1996); Borden v. Brady, 461 N.Y.S.2d 497-98 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983); Ake v. State, 778
P.2d 460, 468 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989); State v. Martinez, 899 P.2d 1302, 1309 (Wash. Ct. App.
1995). As mentioned in connection with the analysis of selected federal circuits, not all of the
decisions in each state may consistently follow a single view. The decisions highlighted here are
those which reject wholesale admission of an expert's admission basis.
For cases prior to 1986, see Ronald L. Carlson, Policing the Bases of Modem Expert
Testimony, 39 VAND. L. REV. 577,584 n.25 (1986). But see Brunner v. Brown, 480 N.W.2d 33,34
(Iowa 1992) ("Experts who make their living from various authenticating sources, and on which
they often make life-and-death decisions, may be reasonably relied upon for judicial purposes.").
The extent of an expert's disclosure is a central focus of attention in numerous courts. The issue
is present in both civil and criminal cases. In criminal law, how far can a prosecution expert go in
invoking reports or opinions, when appearing as a trial witness, of nontestifying experts? The case
of State v. Barrett,445 N.W.2d 749 (Iowa 1989), raises this issue. A pathologist testified that a
decedent was killed, and did not commit suicide. See id. at 751. On redirect examination he was
asked whether any other forensic pathologists with whom the witness had discussed the case gave
him any reason to disregard his opinion that the death was a homicide. See id. Over the defendant's
hearsay objection, the expert said no, "his colleagues had not caused him to change his opinion."
Id. In accord with the earlier Iowa case of State v. Judkins,the Iowa rule does not allow one expert
witness to state that other experts also subscribe to the witness' stated conclusion. 242 N.W.2d 266,
267-68 (Iowa 1976). The Barrettcourt did not consider the error to be reversible, however. 445
N.W.2d at 754.
In Brunner,the court limited the sweep of Barrett.480 N.W.2d at 33. After observing that Rule
703 provides a broadened factual basis for expert testimony, the court added that it is "silent on the
question of whether the underlying hearsay itself is admissible." Id. at 35. In general, the court
approves admission of hearsay statements related to an expert by other persons, but nonetheless
approved exclusion of the hearsay basis in this case because the sources would be witnesses at the
trial. See id. at 34, 37.
The Georgia position is summarized by Paul Milich, in Georgia Rules of Evidence 226 n.13
(1995), wherein Milich makes the point that "any writings containing the opinions of witness[es]
who will not testify are inadmissible, even if the testifying expert relied upon them in forming his
opinion."
157. See MINN. STAT. § 703(b) (1998).
158. See LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 705 (West 2000); see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 703(b)
(Michie 1998); MD. CODE ANN., EVID. § 5-703 (1999).
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alert to their duty to police the bases of modem expert testimony. In United
States v. 0.59 Acres of Land,159 the Court of Appeals reversed because
inadmissible evidence was bootstrapped into the record through a
valuation witness in a property condemnation case.160 The hearsay included
a tax assessor's opinion of property value, a letter from a homeowner
expressing her lay opinion on the subject, and an "unscientific"
homeowner survey on the effect of electromagnetic fields on property
value.16 The survey "was prepared by a non-witness of unknown
qualifications in violation of Rule 703 and would not meet the Daubert
standards for scientific evidence. It is third-hand inadmissible hearsay."' 6 2
Suggesting that there is some outside evidence which might never be
admitted in connection with an expert's testimony, the court ordered a new
trial.
In re James Wilson Associates163 was a case where the trial judge
properly excluded testimony emanating primarily from a nontestifying
engineer.' 6' The engineer had been retained by the trial witness, an
architect. 65 "The architect could use what the engineer told him to offer an
opinion within the architect's domain of expertise, but he could not testify
for the purpose of vouching for the truth of what the engineer had told
him-of becoming in short the engineer's spokesman."' 166 Judge Posner
explained that an expert is permitted to testify to an opinion formed on the
basis of information that is handed to him, but that does not render the
underlying evidence independently admissible. 67 "IT]hejudge must make
sure that the expert isn't being used as a vehicle for circumventing the
rules of evidence."' 168 The court concluded that it is improper to use an
expert witness as a screen against cross-examination of the expert's
nontestifying source. 169

159. 109 F.3d 1493 (9th Cir. 1997).
160. See id. at 1495-96.
161. See id.
162. Id. at 1496. Generally, the approach of allowing otherwise inadmissible evidence to
"illustrate" the expert's opinion is the one followed by this court, although the opinion points out
that the evidence rules do not specifically provide for the admission of the expert's inadmissible

basis. See id.
163. 965 F.2d 160 (7th Cir. 1992).
164. See id. at 172.
165. See id.

166, Id. at 173.
167. See id. at 172.

168. Id. at 173 (citing Gong v. Hirsch, 913 F.2d 1269, 1272-73 (7th Cir. 1990)).
169. See id. The decision observes that in explaining his opinion an expert witness normally
is allowed to explain the facts underlying it, even if they would not be independently admissible.
See id. at 172-73. This situation is not one of those cases allowing disclosure, however.
A district court opinion from the same circuit sharply recognizes the issue identified in this
Article. In Kay v. First ContinentalTrading,Inc., 976 F. Supp. 772 (N.D. Ill.
1997), the plaintiffs
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That numerous state court decisions have moved in this direction is
evidenced by cases identified in Part III of this Article, as well as opinions
like State v. Weber.170 Weber claimed he was mentally ill at the time he
committed his crimes. 7 1 In opposition, the state produced the testimony of
a psychiatrist.172 An important part of his testimony related a conversation
the psychiatrist had with a resident at a state mental hospital. 173 The
resident's statements suggested Weber was faking mental illness. 174 "In
overruling Weber's hearsay objection, the trial court noted that medical
experts routinely rely on hearsay information .... Thus, the trial court
reasoned that the underlying hearsay data upon which a medical expert
relies is admissible."' 175
The appellate court resoundingly disagreed, stating that Wisconsin
Statute section 907.03, which is identical to Rule 703, is not a hearsay
exception. 176 "Hearsay data upon which the expert's opinion is predicated
may not be automatically admitted into evidence by the proponent and
used for the truth of the matter asserted unless the data are otherwise
admissible under a recognized exception to the hearsay rule.', 177 Although
the trial court correctly recognized that Rule 703 allowed the state's
psychiatrist, Dr. Fosdahl, to offer an opinion based in part upon hearsay
data that was otherwise inadmissible, the court erred in its apparent belief
that the statute
also permitted the underlying hearsay data to be admitted
78
as evidence. 1
While Dr. Fosdahl was clearly permitted under [Rule 703] to
rely upon the statement for his ultimate opinion as to Weber's
mental responsibility, the state was obliged to qualify the
statement under some exception to the hearsay rule before the
statement itself could be admitted into evidence79and used
substantively for the truth of the matter asserted.

effort to have an expert relate random conversations he had with colleagues was rebuffed. See id.
at 774. The court pointed out the danger in unrevised Rule 703 which enables an expert's opinion
to be based upon facts or data which need not be admissible in evidence. See id. The unrevised rule
"creates an obvious potential for the use of such opinions as a vehicle for creating a 'back door'
hearsay exception." Id.
170. 496 N.W.2d 762 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
171. See id. at 765.
172. See id.
173. See id. at 766.
174. See id.
175. Id.
176. See id.; see also FED. R. EviD. 703.
177. Weber, 496 N.W.2d at 766.
178. See id. at 767.
179. Id.
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In State v. Martinez,"' the expert on the stand was an arson expert.18
18 2
He testified for the defense that a furnace caused a fire, not arson.
Although the expert developed his opinion at length, the trial court ruled
that he could not testify regarding statements others had made to him
during his investigation.' 3 The ruling was,upheld on appeal.84 "Allowing
[the expert] to testify to the opinions of third parties regarding the
condition of the furnace could have been misleading because the jury
would have been likely to construe this as substantive evidence."8 5
V. COMMENTATORS

Perceptive commentary has recognized the importance of the issue
isolated in this Article. Leading evidence writer Edward J. Imwinkelried
made a pointed observation:
[T]he decision in Daubertspotlighted Rule 702. However, in
truth, another statute, Rule 703, has been the most
controversial aspect of the expert testimony provisions in the
Federal Rules. . . . Although it has been more than two
decades since the Federal Rules of Evidence took effect in
questions about the interpretation of Rule
1975, many 8thorny
6
703 persist.
He identifies as one of the issues the question of whether the expert's
proponent may formally introduce any technically inadmissible
information which the expert reasonably relies upon. 87 He adverts to an
analysis which distinguishes general scientific theories which an expert has
studied from case specific information imparted to an expert from another
person. 8 1 When the expert tries to recite the latter information to the jury

180. 899 P.2d 1302 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
181. See id. at 1308.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 1309.
185. Id. The trial court ruled that the expert could not testify regarding statements others made
to him during the investigation of the facts "if the person was not a witness at trial." Id. at 1308. Cf.
Brunner v. Brown, 480 N.W.2d 33, 33 (Iowa 1991). The Martinez court noted that while trial
courts may allow disclosure of underlying facts or data, courts have been reluctant to allow the use
of evidentiary rules as a mechanism for admitting otherwise inadmissible evidence as an
explanation of the expert's opinion. 899 P.2d at 1309.
186. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Developinga CoherentTheory of the Structureof FederalRule
of Evidence 703,47 MERCER L. REV. 447,449 (1996) (footnotes omitted). See generallyROGER
C. PARKETAL, EVIENCELAW497 (1998) (discussing the law of evidence as applied in American

trials).
187. See Imwinkelried, supra note 186, at 470.
188. See Imwinkelried, supra note 186, at 471.
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over a hearsay objection, several authorities urge exclusion.189
Imwinkelried remarks: "That argument has great merit. ' 90
Robert A. Sachs has studied the problem in products liability
actions.191 An important issue in such cases generally concerns whether a
jury will hear evidence of other accidents involving the same or similar
product.192 In every product liability case where "other accident" evidence
arises, the ruling of the court on this issue has a potentially dramatic effect
on the outcome of the case.' 93 It is pivotal proof, and for this reason is
admitted into evidence, if at all, under strict evidentiary guidelines. Many
cases exclude this sort of testimony. 194 But can a clever practitioner make
an end run around these rules by simply having an expert reference all
manner of details concerning prior accidents, along the way to expressing
his opinion that a product is dangerous?1 95 What about reporting in precise
detail the hearsay complaints of consumers who have had difficulty with
the product? 196 Sachs refers to the "wide open" view which allows into
evidence any supporting data used by an expert, a view which diminishes
the role of the judge and makes the expert sort of a thirteenth juror. 97 He
then supplies his own rejoinder:
Some of us, however, are not comfortable with an
expert's "assumption of the role of superfactfinder and
thirteenth juror" nor with the proposed "diminished role" for
the court, nor are we in favor of creating a hearsay exception
which would permit an expert to act as a conduit for whatever
hearsay or otherwise inadmissible evidence is sought to be
placed before the jury. This is particularly true with regard to
the question of an expert relating to the jury information
about the occurrence of other accidents. The stakes are too
high, the probative value too low, and the likelihood of unfair
prejudice too great.' 98

189. See Imwinkelried, supra note 186, at 472 (referring to state courts in California,
Kentucky, and Minnesota).
190. Id. at 476.
191. Robert A. Sachs, "Other Accident" Evidence in Product Liability Actions: Highly
Probative or an Accident Waiting to Happen?, 49 OKLA. L. RE V. 257 (1996).
192. See id. at 257.
193. See id. at 257-58.
194. See id. at 258.
195. See id. at 285.
196. See id.
197. See id. at 287.
198. Id. (footnotes omitted); see also James W. Diehm, Protecting Criminal Defendants'
Rights When the Government Adduces Scientific Evidence, 22 CAP. U.L. REV. 85, 87-88 (1993)
(expressing concern that the application of Rule 703 in criminal trials can deny criminal defense
counsel adequate opportunity for effective cross-examination).
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The study of prior accidents by Sachs is a reminder that inadmissible
data used to support an expert opinion is not always hearsay but can be
evidence which is blocked by other evidentiary rules. In drafting
exclusionary revisions to Federal Evidence Rule 703, the Advisory
Committee wisely did not tie the rule of exclusion simply to one form of
underlying proof, that is, hearsay.
Professor L. Timothy Perrin identifies one of the abuses which
prompted the need to reevaluate Rule 703:
The "liberal thrust" of the Federal Rules' treatment of expert
testimony [as originally written] reaches its zenith in Rule
703. Rule 703 allows consideration by experts of not only
matters that have not been introduced into evidence, but also
of matters that are inadmissible. Like Rule 704, this
expansion has resulted in unforeseen and unintended abuses,
most significantly the use of the expert as a "conduit" of
hearsay. 9
Recognition of the problem confronting trial judges under current law
was well stated by Charles J. Walsh and Beth S. Rose:
Since its passage, the most difficult issue presented by
Federal Rule of Evidence 703 has been the extent to which
experts may inform the fact finder of the content of the
unadmitted evidence they are using to form their opinions.
Federal Rule of Evidence 703 does not specifically provide
for the disclosure of this information. Moreover, strict
application of hearsay principles and the right to
confrontation in the criminal arena would keep such
information from the fact finder.2 °
Walsh and Rose go on to observe that there is a general preference in
the federal rules for disclosure, requiring careful attention to the subject of
the extent of this disclosure.20 ' Some commentators favor a limited rule
permitting the expert to identify outside sources she used to form opinions
but forbidding detailed disclosure of the contents of otherwise inadmissible
information.' 2

199. L. Timothy Perrin, Expert Witness Testimony: Back to the Future, 29 U. RICH. L. REV.
1389, 1401 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
200. Charles J. Walsh & Beth S. Rose, Increasingthe UsefulInformationProvidedby Experts
in the Courtroom:A Comparisonof FederalRules ofEvidence 703 and 803(18)with the Evidence
Rules in Illinois,Ohio, andNew York, 26 SEToNHA.LL. REv. 183,200 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
201. See id. at 201.
202. See id. at 205.
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On the other hand, Walsh and Rose prefer allowing the trier of fact to
hear the basis for an opinion, perhaps accompanied by a limiting
instruction to simply consider the inadmissible information for the purpose
of evaluating the "coherence and solidity of the expert opinion.' 203 Such
an instruction is favored by a number of courts.2 4 However, many
commentators disagree with the efficacy of limiting instructions of this
kind.2 5 Directing jurors to listen to the expert's inadmissible information
but not to treat it as substantive evidence is self-defeating. Empirical
studies demonstrate thatjuries use expert background hearsay to reach jury
decisions, in spite of judicial instructions to ignore the substantive nature
of facts asserted in the hearsay statements.' A compelling persuasive
effect occurs when an expert is permitted to cite hearsay sources which
buttress his opinions, dramatically influencing the jury.
The grave risk that jurors will misuse the testimony as substantive
proof has been widely recognized. Professor Paul Rice views a limiting
instruction as judicial double-talk. He identifies commentators who favor
free admission of expert background data,20 8 but then insist that the jury be
instructed that the evidence is to be considered for the limited purpose of
evaluating the expert's opinion. 2°9 Rice spots a hole in this approach. "Not

203. Id. at 204.
204. See Wingo v. Rockford Mem'l Hosp., 686 N.E.2d 722,730 (111.App. Ct. 1997) ("Rule
703 does not create an exception to the rule against hearsay because the underlying facts or data are
admitted not for their truth, but for the limited purpose of explaining the basis of an expert's
opinion."). Some otherwise rightly decided cases have fallen into the "illustrate the bases" trap. See,
e.g., Engebretsen v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 21 F.3d 721,730 (6th Cir. 1994). To routinely admit
hearsay and follow it with a limiting instruction permits circumvention by indirection, and allows
a loophole to swallow the rule against hearsay. See id.
205. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The "Bases" ofExpert Testimony: The SyllogisticStructure
of Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1, 12 (1988); Paul R. Rice, InadmissibleEvidence as a
BasisforExpertOpinionTestinony: A Response to ProfessorCarlson,40 VAND. L. REV. 583,58485 (1987); see also Ronald L. Carlson, Collision Course in Expert Testimony: Limitations on
Affirmative Introduction of Underlying Data, 36 U. FIA, L. REV. 234, 244-45 (1984); Ronald L.
Carlson, Experts as HearsayConduits: ConfrontationAbuses in Opinion Testimony, 76 MINN. L.
REV. 859, 872 n.65 (1992).
206. See Regina A. Schuller, Expert Evidence andHearsay,19 LAW&HUMANBEHAVIOR345
(1995), reported in Ronald L. Carlson, Experts, Judges, and Commentators: The Underlying
DebateAbout an Expert's UnderlyingData,47 MERCER L. REV. 481,484 n. 16 (1996).
207. In CHRISTOPHERMUELLER&LAIRD KIRKPATRICK, FEDERALEVIDENcE687 (2d ed. 1994),
the point is made that the hearsay rule means that hearsay statements made to an expert "are not
admissible as proof of what they assert unless they fit some hearsay exception, and it means that
they will be excluded if admitting them brings too much risk that they will be misused as
substantive evidence." The authors conclude: "It seems especially appropriate to restrict direct
examination by the calling party, but to allow the cross-examiner greater latitude." Id. at 689.
"208. See Joanne Epps, Clarifying the Meaning of FederalRule of Evidence 703, 36 B.C. L.
REV. 53, 72-73 (1994).
209. See id.
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explained by [these commentators], however, is how evidence, the truth of
which cannot even be considered by the jury, is supposed to be used to
assess the210
value of a conclusion [by an expert] premised on an assumption
of truth.
Professor Perrin takes a similar position:
[J]urors are asked to do the impossible. They are told to
consider the hearsay, not for its truth, but only as the basis of
the experts opinion. No one truly believes jurors (or anyone
else for that matter) are capable of making that subtle
distinction. Instead,jurors consider the hearsay even when the
evidence is regarded as too unreliable for admission as
substantive evidence.21
Courts have also recognized the futility of delivering the sort of
instruction described here.21 Certainly, such an instruction should be the
exception and not the routine. There may be pressing occasions when this
sort of jury instruction is justified. However, a superior approach is to
simply embrace clear rules of inclusion and exclusion regarding the
expert's underlying data.
VI. PROGRESS AND REViSION: NEW RuLE 703
The Federal Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules met on April 6
and 7, 1998, in New York City and approved three proposed amendments
to the Federal Rules of Evidence. On May 1, 1998, the rule amendments
were sent to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
of the Judicial Conference of the United States.21 3 It was recommended that
Rule 703 be amended to emphasize that when an expert relies on
inadmissible information to form an opinion, it is the opinion and not the
information that is admitted in evidence. The new rule would read as
follows, with the added language which limits introduction of the expert's
background data located at the end of the rule:
Rule 703. Bases of Opinion Testimony by experts
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an
expert bases an opinion or inference may be those
210. Paul R. Rice, The Allure of the Illogic. A CoherentSolutionfor 703 Requires More than
Redefining "Factsor Data,"47 MERCER L. REv. 495,500 (1996). Rice concludes that there should
be a hearsay exception for Rule 703 material. See id.
211. Perrin, supra note 199, at 1403.
212. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 549 So. 2d 1071 n.1 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989).
213. 119 S. Ct. No. 1, Ct. R-273 (1998).
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perceived by or made known to the expert at or before
the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or
inference to be admitted. If the facts or data are
otherwiseinadmissible,they shallnot be disclosed to the
jury by the proponentof the opinionor inference unless
their probative value
substantially outweighs their
214
prejudicialeffect.
In a report to the chair of the standing committee, Judge Fern Smith
who headed the evidence committee, clearly identified the problem studied
in this Article. Judge Smith wrote:
Under current law, litigants can too easily evade an
exclusionary rule of evidence by having an expert rely on
inadmissible evidence in forming an opinion. The
inadmissible information is then disclosed to the jury in the
guise of the expert's basis. The proposed amendment imposes
no limit on an expert's opinion itself. The existing language
of Evidence Rule 703, permitting an expert to rely on
inadmissible information if it is of the type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the field, is retained. Rather, the
limitations imposed by the proposed amendment relate 215
to the
disclosure of this inadmissible information to the jury.
Under the proposed amendment, the otherwise inadmissible
information cannot be disclosed to the jury unless its probative value in

214. Id. at Ct. R-295 (emphasis added). On April 12 and 13, 1999, the Federal Advisory
Committee made a modest language alteration in the final sentence of the proposed rule, changing
the last sentence to read: "Facts or data that are offered solely to assist the jury in evaluating an
expert's opinion shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference
unless the court determines that their probative value for that purpose substantially outweighs their
prejudicial effect." Id. Unless changed in the interim, the rule takes effect on December 1, 2000.
215. Id. at Ct. R-274. That guidance is sorely needed on this issue is borne out by trial court
decisions rejecting the efforts of lawyers to run inadmissible material into the record, followed by
appeals of adverse decisions on the point, as well by trial court decisions which had to be reversed
on appeal because of errors in the admission of expert hearsay. Several of these cases have been
identified in this Article. See supra notes 101 & 104 and accompanying text.
Confusion is also present in some instances regarding a related issue. In some courts, whether
a trial judge will admit or exclude underlying hearsay depends upon whether the source is available.
Some trial courts apparently admit the underlying hearsay data only if the source is scheduled to
be a trial witness. In other courts, an exactly opposite rule holds sway. A trial judge may refuse to
admit the hearsay when the source is scheduled to be a trial witness. In the latter courts, if the
source for an expert's opinion will appear and provide testimony from the witness stand, recitation
of the source's hearsay by the expert is barred. See supra note 185.
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assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs
the prejudicial effect of the information. 2 ' 6 The Advisory Committee's
Note supplies advice on how the new provision is to the administered:
"The amendment provides a presumption against disclosure to the jury of
otherwise inadmissible information used as the basis of an expert's opinion
or inference,
where that information is offered by the proponent of the
217
expert.
In cases where the judge rules against full introduction of underlying
data, modest identification of her sources of information may be made by
the expert. Professor Daniel J. Capra explains how this works:
When the probative value of the information in assessing the
expert's basis is substantially outweighed by the risk that the
jury will misuse the information despite a limiting instruction,
then the trial court should permit only a general reference to
the information. For example, with the arson expert, the trial
court might permit the expert to testify that he interviewed
police officers and bystanders, without allowing the expert to
specifically disclose what he was told by them. If limitation
to a general reference is not enough to control the risk of
misuse relative to the probative value of the information, then
the trial court should allow the expert's opinion but prohibit
an elicitation of the inadmissible
information as part of the
218
opinion.
that
of
basis
Importantly, the cross-examiner who is protected by the rule can
waive its safeguards. The Advisory Committee's Note makes the point:
"Nothing in this Rule restricts the presentation of underlying expert facts
or data when offered by an adverse party."2 9 This approach is in keeping
with prudent state revisions of Rule 703. For example, the Minnesota rule,
as amended, bars the wholesale introduction of an expert's underlying data
on direct examination, then provides as follows: "Nothing in this rule
restricts the admissibility of underlying expert data when inquired into on
cross-examination.
In Louisiana, the rule in criminal cases provides that
"every expert witness must state the facts upon which his opinion is based,

216. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
217. 119 S. Ct. No. 1, Ct. R-297 advisory committee's note. This author's views are cited in
the advisory committee's note. See id.
218. Daniel Capra, The DaubertPuzzle, 32 GA. L. REV. 699, 780 (1998); see also FED. R.
EVID. 403. Capra's indication of how revised Rule 703 would operate appears to obviate
constitutional concerns in criminal cases, by and large. See Ronald L. Carlson, In Defense of a
ConstitutionalTheory of Experts, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 1182, 1183 (1993).
219. 119 S. Ct. No. 1, CL R-297.
220. MINN. R. EVID. 703(b); see also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 207 (discussing
the propriety of a special rule for cross-examiners).
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provided, however, that with respect to evidence which would otherwise
be inadmissible such basis shall only be elicited on cross-examination. 22 '
Self-serving, bolstering, and corroborative assertions from hearsay
sources, when sought to be invoked by a trial expert on his own behalf, are
barred under the new federal proposal. However, legal policy allows an
opposing party to force disclosure of an expert's underlying facts on crossexamination. This is consistent with practice under Federal Evidence Rule
612. Rule 612 controls procedure when a witness refreshes his memory
from a writing prepared by himself or another. Suppose a witness
experiences a failure of memory during direct examination. When the
witness accomplishes the refreshing process on the witness stand in front
of a jury, there is consensus that the underlying document does not come
into evidence merely because it refreshed recollection. Introduction options
belong to the cross-examiner, not to the proponent of a witness who
needed to look at a document in order to provide direct testimony. 222
The overall plan of the revised rule is sound and is in keeping with
current United States Supreme Court trends. The proliferation of experts
and their descent upon the court has been well-documented. 23 Junk
science abounds, and the unscientific presentations of "for hire" experts
threaten the credibility of the many skilled professionals who testify. By
the time the Federal Rules of Evidence had their twenty-year anniversary,
it was time for the Supreme Court to take hold of expert testimony 2in
24
federal trials. The Court did so in three major decisions in the 1990s.
Refining the rules, the Court imposed a reliability standard on experts in
the case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,225 requiring
trial judges to ask whether there was testing of the expert's methodology,
the error rate, peer review, and the level of scientific acceptance.226 These
are factors which a judge should weigh when admitting or excluding
scientific proof.
After Daubert,questions like whether combining Tylenol and alcohol
causes liver damage, the impact on the body of breast implants, and
whether Benedictin causes birth defects were resolved under the Daubert
standard. Left open in Daubert was the issue of the finality of a trial
court's decision to admit or exclude scientific evidence. A 1997 decision,
227 addressed this issue. In Georgia, a
General Electric Co. v. Joiner,
plaintiff sued over his workplace exposure to chemical PCBs, claiming

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 705 (West 1998).
See Carlson, supra note 156, at 583-84; Imwinkelried, supra note 186, at 475-76.
See lmwinkelried,supranote 186, at 447-48; seealso Carlson,supranote 156, at 577-78.
See infranotes 225,227, 240 and accompanying text.
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
See id. at 593-94.
522 U.S. 136, 138-39 (1997).
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they promoted his cancer. 228 The case was removed to federal court where
the defense moved for summary judgment.229 Plaintiff responded with the
depositions of experts who testified that PCBs and derivative substances
can promote cancer, and opined that the plaintiff's condition was likely
caused by these chemicals. 23 0 The trial court apparently disagreed. Among
other findings, the United States District Court found the alleged link
between PCBs and small-cell lung cancer speculative. The court felt that
the testimony to the contrary did not rise above subjective belief.23 ' The
District Court concluded that four epidemiological studies on which the
plaintiff relied were not a sufficient basis for the expert's opinion. Their
testimony was inadmissible. Summary judgment was granted.2 32
The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the District Court had
erred in excluding the expert testimony. 233 The Supreme Court was faced
with difficult questions. To what extent is a trial court's judgment on such
a matter binding? Is a trial court required to honor an expert's assertions
that his conclusions are sound, or is there a "gatekeeping" function to
screen scientific evidence and independently determine its relevance and
23 4

reliability?

Chief Justice Rehnquist observed that "while the Federal Rules of
Evidence allow district courts to admit a somewhat broader range of
scientific evidence than would have been admissible under Frye, they
leave in place the 'gatekeeper' role of the trial judge in screening such
evidence."2 3 5 The Eleventh Circuit had criticized the fact that the trial
judge drew different conclusions from the research than did each of the
experts.2 36 The Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Circuit failed to give
the trial judge's ruling the deference it deserved.2 37 The correct standard is
whether the judge abused his discretion in excluding scientific evidence,
said the Court.2 38 "[T]he District Court did not abuse its discretion. 23 9
In 1999, the impetus to exclude expert testimony when such proof is
at the margins of modem technology gained momentum when the Court
decided Kumho Tire. Co. v. Carmichael.240 The gatekeeping function of

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

See id. at 139.
See id. at 140.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 141.
Id. at 142.
See id.at 141.
See id. at 143.
See id. at 146.
Id. at 147.
119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999).
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trial judges to make certain that the expert's conclusions are based on
scientific principles applies broadly when experts are offered as
witnesses.2 41 It applies not only to scientific proof but also to testimony
based on technical or other specialized knowledge.242
In the Kumho Tire case, the right rear tire of a minivan blew out,
causing a severe accident. 43 In the plaintiff's action against Kumho Tire
Company, an expert testified that a defect in the tire's manufacture or
design caused the blow-out. 2' Kumho Tire moved the District Court to
exclude the expert's testimony on the ground that his methodology failed
reliability requirements. 45 The expert relied primarily upon skill and
experience-based observations, as opposed to scientific theories.246
Nonetheless, Daubertapplied and the Court made no distinction between
scientific knowledge on one hand, and technical or other specialized
knowledge on the other.247
The expert's testimony was required to pass a standard of evidentiary
reliability.248 Important questions include the following. Has his technique
been tested? Has it been subjected to peer review and publication? What
is the error rate? Is the principle generally accepted? In the view of the
Court, none of these Daubertfactors supported the expert's testimony.249
The expert was properly excluded by the district judge.250
The policing function imposed on the judiciary by revised Rule 703
is consistent with these current Supreme Court directions. Admittedly, the
recent Supreme Court cases focus on a different problem. The trilogy of
Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho Tire address a party's need to make a
foundational showing that the expert's opinions are based upon reliable
theories under Federal Evidence Rule 702.251 However, the overarching
objective of this line of authority is to ensure that the jury is exposed only
to reliable expert testimony. 25' Revised Rule 703 advances a similar
objective. The rule endeavors to ensure that reliable and probative
information comes before the trier of fact on one hand, and to minimize the

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

See id. at 1176.
See id. at 1174-76.
See id. at 1171.
See id.
See id. at 1172.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1176.
See id. at 1176-77.
See id. at 1179.
See supra notes 225, 227, 240 and accompanying text.
See id.
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potential misuse of the
risk of prejudice resulting
3 from the jury's
other.Z
the
on
information
New Rule 703 does not answer all of the questions, nor should it.2 4
It prevents disclosure to the jury when the expert's basis is prejudicial, but
does not spell out the circumstances when this might occur. Rather, the
drafting committee adopted a prejudice-balancing formula which appears
to be a blend of Federal Evidence Rules 403 and 609. Under it, the
proponent of disclosure will have the burden of demonstrating that the
probative value of the information in assessing the expert's opinion
substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. Only after an affirmative
decision is made on this issue will other steps be addressed. The objecting
party may request and secure a limiting instruction informing the jury that
the underlying information must not be used for substantive purposes. z 5When the judge performs her gatekeeping function, what kind of
material will be barred from exposure to the trier of fact? When will the
details of an expert's underlying data remain undisclosed? As noted, the
rule leaves this in the hands of the trial court, subject to the presumption
against disclosure. Presumably things such as bolstering conclusions from
other experts, hearsay from bystanders at an accident scene which do not
qualify under any hearsay exception, and proof of other remote crimes in
criminal cases when they do not come under the "other crimes" exception
are the sorts of materials which cannot be laundered through an expert.
One case cited earlier in this Article suggested that there is some
underlying evidence which might never be admitted in connection with an
expert's testimony.256 Another advises trial judges to exclude reference to

253. See 119 Ct. Ct. No. 1, Ct. R-296-97.
254. The new rule offers no distinctions between underlying facts versus underlying opinions.
Some courts have endeavored to do this. See, e.g., Thorne v. U-Haul of Metro D.C., Inc., 580 A.2d
672 (D.C. 1990) (holding that medical testimony by non-specialist doctor about findings of
specialist admissible because they were simple, routine observations, not the specialist's
conjectural, complex diagnosis); see also C.S.I. Chemical Sales, Inc. v. Mapco Gas Products, Inc.,
557 N.W.2d 528 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996) (information from other experts admissible, but not
recitation of material from them which simply corroborates the trial witness). Again, the choices
made by the Advisory Committee were sound. In the areaof expert testimony, it is difficult to know
where fact ends and opinion starts.
255. What has been criticized in this Article has been the regular admission of prejudicial
hearsay, followed by the pious incantation of a limiting instruction. See supra notes 204, 212 and
accompanying text. The Federal Evidence Advisory Committee's proposal does not envision such
an unwholesome procedure. Rather, with the presumption against disclosure to the jury, injection
of expert hearsay should be the exception, not the rule. The delivery of an instruction will certainly
not be routine, as is the case in some courts today, because of restrictions on the introduction of
underlying data. Accordingly, only on limited occasions will a special instruction be needed.
256. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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outside sources when it is apparent that the trial expert is being used as a
screen against cross-examination of the expert's nontestifying source. 25
Exclusion of this sort of prejudicial and untrustworthy information is
best left to case-by-case delineation in the courts. 8 Meanwhile, the
Advisory Committee has provided a workable framework within which
judges may operate.
VII. CONCLUSION

With its presumption against disclosure to the jury of otherwise
inadmissible information used as the basis of an expert's opinion, the
Federal Advisory Committee has spoken. It has spoken wisely. This
Article has identified numerous situations where trial courts were confused
or misled in the application of unrevised Rule 703. Costly errors occurred.
Appellate correction was needed. With the advent of the new rule, the
miscalculations identified here should end.
Experts were originally viewed as impartial specialists who came to
trials to explain technical concepts to triers of fact. Over time, experts
became advocates for the side which hired them. The practice of providing
opinions for hire changed the impression of experts from one of respected
professionals to, in several cases, that of mercenaries and prostitutes."z 9
The growth of the expert testimony business into a cottage industry
prompted reform proposals. 26° It ultimately became clear that a "let it all
in" philosophy was inadequate for modem conditions. One aspect of this
philosophy was the ability of experts to expose the trier of fact to raw and
unexpurgated hearsay. This has now been curtailed. The Federal Evidence
Rules Advisory Committee has struck a blow against wide-open admission
of otherwise inadmissible information. The limitations suggested by the
committee are sound. They will help to restore expert witness practice to
a respected sector of the litigation process.

257. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
258. That there are prevalent efforts to use Rule 703 as a conduit for back door hearsay is
evidenced by the cases cited in this Article. See supra notes 14-90, 117-30, 159-80.
259. See Perrin, supra note 199, at 1389, 1469.
260. See David Faigman, Commentary, A Response to ProfessorCarlson:Strugglingto Stop
the Floodof UnreliableExpert Testimony, 76 MiNN.L. REV. 877 (1992). Professor Faigman warns:
"Experts are conduits not only for hearsay but for a wide variety of unreliable and inaccurate
information." Id. at 889; see also In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, 795 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir.
1986) (advocating an adherence to the deferential standards for review of decisions, but cautioning
judges to look closely at experts who supplement their salaries by testifying and spend substantially
all of their time consulting).
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